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I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that 
arbitration agreements in maritime transactions or contracts evidencing 
transactions involving commerce are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.1  
The text of the FAA, however, does not address the friction that arises 
when the FAA applies to binding arbitration agreements that affect 
federal statutory rights.2  As a result of this tension, courts developed the 
effective vindication rule.3  Under this rule, courts inquire into whether 
the arbitration provision at issue leaves a party unable to effectively 
vindicate its federal statutory rights through arbitration.4  If so, courts will 
not enforce the arbitration provision. 
Because class actions are more integral for modern aggregate party 
proceedings, since the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 23 (“FRCP 23”) in 1966, the FAA’s relationship with class 
actions is becoming increasingly relevant.5  The FAA’s text is silent, 
however, with regard to class actions.6  The Supreme Court’s 2013 
decision in American Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
(“Italian Colors”)7 illustrates the need for courts to revisit and clarify the 
effective vindication rule to provide a more informative standard and 
process for evaluating arbitration agreements that prohibit aggregate 
 
1 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “maritime transactions”).  
Additionally, similar provisions are prevalent in state arbitration codes.  William M. Howard, 
Annotation, The Validity of Arbitration Clause Precluding Class Actions, 13 A.L.R. 6TH 145 
(2014) (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 
2 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
3 The effective vindication rule is a more fact specific, modern approach to the previously 
applied doctrine of nonarbitrability, which rejected the use of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in causes of action under various federal laws including securities laws.  See, e.g., 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“[W]e decide that the intention of Congress 
concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid . . . an agreement for 
arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas 
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
4 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
6 Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 767, 774 (2012). 
7 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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party proceedings.8  As a result of these pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements becoming more prevalent in areas such as employment and 
commercial contracts, there is a need for further guidance regarding 
judicial evaluation of these agreements.9 
The majority in Italian Colors failed to provide adequate guidance.  
First, the majority did not consider the entirety of the contract at issue and 
consequently blurred the meaning of the effective vindication rule.10  
Second, because the majority did not address multiple ancillary 
provisions in the contract, commercial entities are left without guidance 
as to how courts will view them and whether courts will consistently 
enforce them.11  Third, the majority mistakenly applied its own recent 
precedent.12  Fourth, the majority mistakes the right to pursue claims with 
the ability to pursue claims, which will often have the same practical 
effect of parties foregoing a claim because it is prohibitively expensive.13  
Through these errors, the possibility for abuse in adhesion contracts is 
seemingly limitless, as a multitude of potential claimants may be left 
without avenues to vindicate their rights, and commercial entities may 
effectively insulate themselves from liability through creatively 
constructed agreements. 
Accordingly, the effective vindication rule must be revisited, 
clarified, and codified in the FAA to specify that the rule applies 
exclusively to the interaction between the FAA and federal statutory 
rights and that the totality of the parties’ contract requires consideration 
when evaluating whether an arbitration agreement leaves claimants with 
no possible avenue to vindicate their rights.  This entails: (1) providing 
that all potential costs associated with pursuing a claim may be 
considered; (2) emphasizing the cost-shifting nature and the ability of an 
aggrieved party to spread costs under the agreement; (3) prohibiting 
 
8 Id. 
9 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and 
the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 458 (2011) 
(discussing data showing that businesses entities are increasing their use of arbitration 
agreements in both consumer and employment settings). 
10 See infra Part III.A. 
11 See infra Part III.B. 
12 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2304.  Specifically, the majority mistook the principles 
developed in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  Concepcion is 
discussed in Part II.D. 
13 See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Our decision [in 
Green Tree] made clear that a provision raising a plaintiff's costs could foreclose 
consideration of federal claims, and so run afoul of the effective-vindication rule.”). 
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baldly exculpatory clauses and prohibitive fees; and (4) providing that an 
avenue for effective vindication is foreclosed when the provisions 
function to make pursuit of the claim reasonably certain to be either 
financially imprudent or expressly barred.14 
Part II provides an overview of several developments and influential 
cases addressing and giving rise to the application of the effective 
vindication rule.  Part III explains in further detail the reasons that the 
effective vindication rule must be revisited, clarified, and codified.  Part 
IV concludes by suggesting a way in which the standard for the effective 
vindication rule should be codified in the text of the FAA. 
 
II. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW 
A. Statutory Background 
Congress enacted the FAA in an effort to combat judicial hostility 
to arbitration.15  The regulatory framework for arbitration in the United 
States is set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.16  The FAA 
provides, in part: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evidencing 
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.17 
The first part of this rule represents the motive behind the enactment 
of the FAA—arbitration agreements are a matter of contract and a 
demonstration of the movement towards favoring freedom of contract in 
this realm.18  Although the FAA’s text provides that valid arbitration 
 
14 Even the majority in Italian Colors would refuse to enforce a baldly exculpatory clause 
that “forbid[s] the assertion of certain statutory rights.”  Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
15 Id. at 2308–09 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 
(2011)). 
16 Weston, supra note 6, at 771 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)). 
17 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
18 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (“[The FAA] reflects the overarching 
principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. 
Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (stating that terms of arbitration agreements must be adhered to even 
when alleged violation of a federal statute is at issue, unless the FAA was “overridden by a 
contrary congressional command”); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 
281 (1995) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (“States may regulate contracts, including arbitration 
clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause 
‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”); Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (explaining that courts must 
“rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements pursuant to their terms); Weston, supra note 6, at 
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agreements ought to be enforced, it is silent with regard to a party’s right 
to proceed in aggregate form.19  Because aggregate party proceedings, 
particularly in the realm of class arbitration, are becoming increasingly 
common, this issue is becoming increasingly relevant.20 
For decades, courts rescued federal statutory rights from the FAA.21  
Courts took the approach known as the nonarbitrability doctrine, which 
was premised on the reasoning that Congress intended that such claims 
should not be addressed through arbitration that “cannot provide an 
adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding.”22  However, as arbitration 
became more prevalent, this rigid approach was tested.23  The Supreme 
Court eventually disposed of the doctrine of nonarbitrability in favor of 
the effective vindication rule.24 
The familiar contract law concept of unconscionability also plays a 
major role in binding arbitration provisions.25  Consequently, a party 
could challenge an arbitration provision through the effective vindication 
rule or the unconscionability defense.26  On the surface, such an approach 
makes intuitive sense because both doctrines are very similar and 
typically apply to one-sided arbitration provisions.27  Specifically, the two 
approaches overlap because substantive unconscionability evaluates the 
fairness of a contractual provision.28  Therefore, if a party successfully 
 
772 (explaining that freedom of contract is a fundamental purpose of the FAA). 
19 See 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
20 Cole, supra note 9, at 499–505. 
21 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“[W]e decide that the intention of 
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid . . . an 
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”), overruled by 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
22 Byrd, 470 U.S. at 223.  For a brief historical overview of the development of the 
nonarbitrability doctrine and a related doctrine, the separability doctrine, see Peter B. 
Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 552–54 (2008). 
23 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (“[W]e have 
recognized that federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration . . . 
.”). 
24 See id. at 90. 
25 See, e.g., Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (“As we 
have repeatedly recognized, unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense that 
may render an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.”). 
26 See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining how both 
the effective vindication rule and the unconscionability defense can be applied to claims 
challenging one-sided arbitration provisions). 
27 Id. at 63 (“As a practical matter, there are striking similarities between the vindication 
of statutory rights analysis and the unconscionability analysis.”). 
28 See A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).  
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demonstrates that a contractual provision denied it of its federal statutory 
rights, courts could deem that provision either unconscionable due to 
unfairness, invalid pursuant to the effective vindication rule, or both.29 
Although the effective vindication rule has taken the place of the 
stricter doctrine of nonarbitrability, the concern remains the same 
wherein parties do not find themselves precluded from pursuing federal 
statutory rights as a result of adhesion contracts.30 
 
B. Mitsubishi Motors and the Emergence of the Effective 
Vindication Rule 
The emergence of the effective vindication rule is illustrated in 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 
(“Mitsubishi”).31  The case arose after an automobile manufacturer 
brought suit against an automobile dealer for failing to pay for 966 
ordered vehicles and various other breaches of the sales procedure 
agreement.32  The dealer counterclaimed for multiple statutory violations 
regarding unfair competition, including alleged violations of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.33 
In concluding that claims under federal statutes, including the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, are generally subject to arbitration pursuant to a 
pre-dispute agreement, the Supreme Court warned that such claims might 
not always be properly sent to arbitration according to the pre-dispute 
agreements.34  The Court emphasized the purpose of the FAA by 
explaining that courts must “shake off the old judicial hostility to 
 
In A&M Produce, the court discussed California’s substantive unconscionability 
jurisprudence and explained that substantive unconscionability concerns the actual content of 
the contract at issue and a court may deem a contract unconscionable “if it reallocates the 
risks of the bargain in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.”  Id.  For further 
discussion on unconscionability, see Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive 
Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to 
Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 946–51 (1986). 
29 See Kristian, 446 F.3d at 63–64 (finding several arbitration provisions prevented the 
vindication of plaintiffs’ federal statutory rights and discussing the two methods of analysis). 
30 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
n.19 (1985) (noting that when “choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem 
as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, 
[the court] would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public 
policy”). 
31 See generally id.  
32 Id. at 616, 619–20. 
33 Id. at 619–20. 
34 Id. at 627.  The Sherman Antitrust Act is found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
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arbitration,” but cautioned that this did not mean that parties are left 
without recourse for their statutory claims; rather, they are properly 
arbitrated as long as such claims can be adequately addressed.35 
The Court, by explaining that an arbitration agreement will be 
enforced “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,” introduced the foundation 
of the effective vindication rule as a mechanism to ensure that statutory 
rights are not foreclosed through an arbitration agreement.36  Furthermore, 
the Court opined that if an arbitration agreement effectively foreclosed “a 
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” it would be invalidated.37  The 
Court then explained several common contract defenses to enforcing an 
arbitration agreement and concluded that the agreement ought to be set 
aside if the proceedings “in the contractual forum will be so gravely 
difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for all practical 
purposes be deprived of his day in court.”38  The effective vindication 
rule, however, will only be applied in extreme circumstances when the 
agreement forecloses—as opposed to merely lessens or complicates—a 
party’s ability to pursue a federal statutory claim.39 
The Court explained that arbitration, in general, could serve as a 
legitimate substitute for judicial proceedings.40  Although the Court 
demonstrated a trend towards accepting arbitration, it did not give 
organizations a license to override federal statutory rights through their 
 
35 Id. at 638 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 
985 (2d Cir. 1942)).  Specifically, the court explained that “a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial, forum.”  Id. at 628. 
36 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637. 
37 Id. at 637 n.19 (“[I]n the event . . . clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver 
of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little 
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
38 Id. at 632–33 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
39 Id. at 637 n.19. 
40 Id. at 628 (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial, forum.  It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the 
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”).  The Court also 
noted the potential role of arbitration in international transactions.  Id. at 629 (citing Scherk 
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)) (“[W]e conclude that concerns of international 
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the 
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes 
require that we enforce the parties’ agreement . . . .”). 
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arbitration contracts.41  The Court effectively reeled in the rigid 
nonarbitrability doctrine and replaced it with a more case-by-case, 
flexible approach to invalidate arbitration provisions as needed.42 
 
C. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph: Clarifying the 
Burden of Proof for Invoking the Effective Vindication Rule 
The Supreme Court directly addressed the effective vindication rule 
in Green Tree.43  Randolph, the plaintiffs, purchased a mobile home with 
the aid of financing through Green Tree.44  Green Tree’s contract with 
Randolph required that Randolph purchase Vendor’s Single Interest 
insurance and mandated arbitration of all disputes arising out of the 
contract.45  Although the loan contract between the two parties mandated 
arbitration, the agreement was silent as to arbitration costs and fees.46 
Randolph subsequently filed a class action against Green Tree 
pursuant to both the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., for 
failing to disclose the required insurance purchase as a finance charge, 
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f, for 
mandating that Randolph arbitrate her statutory causes of action.47  
Pursuant to the contract, Green Tree sought to compel arbitration, but 
Randolph argued that she did not possess the requisite finances to proceed 
in arbitration.48  Specifically, Randolph alleged that “arbitration filing fees 
for claims below $10,000 were generally $500 and that the average 
arbitrator’s fee per day is $700.”49  The District Court ordered arbitration 
pursuant to the contract, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, and the Supreme 
Court ultimately reversed the Circuit Court’s ruling.50 
 
41 David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights 
Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 734 (2012) (“Thus, although the Court paved the way for 
the arbitration of federal statutory claims, it declined to give companies carte blanche to 
rewrite the public laws through one-sided arbitration clauses.”). 
42 Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (explaining that if an arbitration 
contract operated “as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies . . . 
we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy”). 
43 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
44 Id. at 82. 
45 Id. at 82–83.  Vendor's Single Interest insurance “protects the vendor or lienholder 
against the costs of repossession in the event of default.”  Id. at 82. 
46 Id. at 82–83. 
47 Id. at 83. 
48 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 90 n.6. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 83–84. 
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The Supreme Court’s reasoning hinged on the speculative nature of 
these allegedly prohibitive costs.51  Although the Court did not challenge 
the premise that high costs associated with an arbitration contract could 
provide the basis for invalidating the contract, the Court ultimately 
considered Randolph’s allegation regarding her prospective costs as too 
speculative to warrant invocation of the effective vindication rule.52 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court clarified that the party arguing 
that the arbitration agreement as written is prohibitively expensive “bears 
the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.”53  However, 
the Court declined to precisely address the threshold level of that burden 
of proof, as the plaintiff in Green Tree presented only “speculative” 
costs.54  Additionally, nothing in the Court’s opinion indicates that such 
fees were in any way unique and therefore, the Court left open the 
possibility for various other costs to form the basis for finding a process 
prohibitively expensive.55  Although dicta, if the Court had addressed this 
issue, the Court may have provided future guidance for similar issues and 
may have been influential in the Italian Colors decision.56  Specifically, 
the Green Tree Court could have provided guidance for how courts 
 
51 Id. at 91 (“The ‘risk’ that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too 
speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 92 (“Similarly, we believe that where, as here, a party seeks to invalidate an 
arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that 
party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.  Randolph did not 
meet that burden.”). 
54 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 92 (“How detailed the showing of prohibitive 
expense must be before the party seeking arbitration must come forward with contrary 
evidence is a matter we need not discuss; for in this case neither during discovery nor when 
the case was presented on the merits was there any timely showing at all on the point.”). 
55 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that “Randolph gave no hint of distinguishing among the different 
ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to bring” and that “[i]ts rationale 
applies whenever an agreement makes the vindication of federal claims impossibly 
expensive—whether by imposing fees or proscribing cost-sharing or adopting some other 
device”). 
56 See id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Our decision there made clear that a provision raising 
a plaintiff's costs could foreclose consideration of federal claims, and so run afoul of the 
effective-vindication rule.  The expense at issue in Randolph came from a filing fee combined 
with a per-diem payment for the arbitrator.  But nothing about those particular costs is 
distinctive; and indeed, a rule confined to them would be weirdly idiosyncratic.  Not 
surprisingly, then, Randolph gave no hint of distinguishing among the different ways an 
arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to bring.  Its rationale applies whenever an 
agreement makes the vindication of federal claims impossibly expensive—whether by 
imposing fees or proscribing cost-sharing or adopting some other device.”). 
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should “distinguish [] among the different ways an arbitration agreement 
can make a claim too costly to bring.”57  Nonetheless, Randolph set forth 
the principle that the party seeking to set aside the agreement must present 
sufficiently certain evidence of such an effective prohibition.58  Such a 
requirement should reduce the risk of frivolous claims and prevent 
increased costs for those entities seeking to avoid costly litigation through 
these agreements. 
 
D. Waxing and Waning of Class Action Waivers from Discover 
Bank v. Superior Court to AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. 
In the years preceding Italian Colors, the Supreme Court halted a 
trend, largely spearheaded by California courts, disfavoring arbitration 
agreements containing class action waivers.59  Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court’s stance on the effective vindication rule remained murky before 
Italian Colors because the Supreme Court did not directly rely upon the 
effective vindication rule as applied to class action waivers with 
prohibitively expensive prospective costs.60 
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court,61 the California Supreme Court 
invalidated an arbitration agreement’s class action waiver for 
unconscionability.62  Specifically, this reasoning applied to claims of low 
value because such claims were only prudently pursued on a class action 
 
57 Id. 
58 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 91 (explaining that to invalidate arbitration 
agreements based on the speculative risk of alleged costs “would undermine the ‘liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements’”) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
59 Compare Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (invalidating a 
class action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement which made low value claims 
imprudent to pursue), with AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) 
(holding that the FAA preempted the state case law rule derived from Discover Bank and 
compelling arbitration), and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l. Corp., 559 U.S. 662 
(2010) (holding that class wide arbitration was improper when the agreement at issue provided 
no guidance concerning the availability of class proceedings). 
60 The contract in Stolt-Nielsen did not provide for either the allowance or preclusion of 
class arbitration.  Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684–85 (explaining there was no contractual basis 
for the party to submit to class arbitration).  Concepcion was decided on the basis of 
preemption; specifically, that the rule derived from Discover Bank conflicted with the FAA.  
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (“States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with 
the FAA.”). 
61 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
     62   Id. at 1110. 
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basis, if at all.63  After Discover Bank, several other jurisdictions followed 
California’s lead in this field of class action waivers applying to low value 
claims.64 
However, the Supreme Court halted this trend in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. and AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion.65  In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that class arbitration was 
not appropriate when the arbitration provision at issue was “silent” with 
regard to the availability of class arbitration.66  The Court was wary of 
presuming mutual consent to class wide arbitration absent an explicit 
allowance for it.67  Then, in Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA 
preempted the rule derived from Discover Bank.68  Specifically, the rule 
derived from Discover Bank was deemed to be preempted by the FAA on 
the basis of implied conflict preemption, as the rule could potentially slow 
proceedings and the resolution of challenges.69 
In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted 
California’s rule invalidating class action waivers as unconscionable.70  
Because the holding was premised on preemption, the effective 
vindication rule was inapplicable and therefore not addressed.71  As a 
 
63 Id. at 1107–08. 
64 See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 978–79 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (citing ten California cases which also held various class arbitration waivers 
unconscionable). 
65 See generally Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740; Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. 662. 
66 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 684 (“[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA 
to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party 
agreed to do so.”). 
67 Id. at 685–86 (“[T]he relative benefits of class-action arbitration are much less assured, 
giving reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to resolve disputes through class-wide 
arbitration.”). 
68 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (“[C]lass arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover 
Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”). 
69 For a brief explanation of implied obstacle preemption, see infra note 160.  The 
Concepcion Court explained that this could make “the process slower, more costly, and more 
likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.  
This was deemed to “interfere[] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[] a 
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”  Id. at 1748. 
70 See Weston, supra note 6, at 769 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740) (“Concepcion 
Court stated that California's judicial rule invalidating class action waivers as unconscionable 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress [in the FAA].’  Therefore, according to the Court, the FAA preempted the 
California law.”).  The rule that was preempted was derived from Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
71 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2319–20 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“And just as this case is not about class actions, [Concepcion] was not—and could 
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result, the decision did little more than state an accepted rule that federal 
law preempts contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause.72 
Consequently, Concepcion provides little guidance as to the 
effective vindication rule’s role between the FAA and federal statutory 
claims.  Notably, Justice Antonin Scalia explained that even if class 
actions might be necessary for smaller claims, which entail a higher cost 
than the recovery is worth, a state cannot enact legislation contrary to the 
FAA.73  The Court did not attempt to apply the effective vindication rule 
because this was a matter of state law preempted by the FAA, so the 
effective vindication rule, which applies when the claims are federal in 
nature, was inapplicable.74 
Justice Scalia explained the importance of the cost-shifting 
provisions that were available to induce litigation in the contract at issue.75  
The Court directly addressed the argument that aggregate proceedings 
were necessary to preserve the availability to pursue claims of low value.76  
Although the Court explained that proceedings pursuant to the cost-
shifting mechanisms of the arbitration contract would be preferable to 
class action proceedings, it is important to note that the Court ultimately 
decided this issue on the fundamental doctrine of preemption.77 
 
not have been—about the effective-vindication rule.  Here is a tip-off: [Concepcion] nowhere 
cited our effective-vindication precedents.”); see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
72 Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“And if that is not enough, [Concepcion] involved 
a state law, and therefore could not possibly implicate the effective-vindication rule.  When a 
state rule allegedly conflicts with the FAA, we apply standard preemption principles, asking 
whether the state law frustrates the FAA’s purposes and objectives.”). 
73 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (“States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent 
with the FAA.”). 
74 In American Express, Justice Kagan explained that Concepcion “could not possibly 
implicate” the effective vindication rule because it involved a state law that was preempted 
by the FAA and rendered invalid through the Supremacy Clause.  Am. Express Co., 133 S. 
Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Justice Kagan further emphasized the distinction by 
explaining that the effective vindication rule is only applicable when it is alleged that the FAA 
conflicts with another federal law.  Id. (emphasis added). 
75 See id. at 2320 (discussing the benefits of the contract’s cost-shifting provisions).  
Specifically, Justice Kagan emphasized that the complaint in Concepcion “was ‘most unlikely 
to go unresolved’ because AT&T's agreement contained a host of features ensuring that 
‘aggrieved customers who filed claims would be essentially guaranteed to be made whole.’”  
Id. (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753). 
76 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (rejecting the dissent’s argument that “class 
proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through 
the legal system”). 
77 Id. (“But States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it 
is desirable for unrelated reasons.”).  For cost-sharing, see id. (“[T]he arbitration agreement 
provides that AT&T will pay claimants a minimum of $7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees 
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At first glance, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion appear to severely 
diminish the availability of class actions.78  However, the effective 
vindication rule balances the FAA with federal statutory rights and does 
not apply to these state law contract principles.79  Therefore, Stolt-Nielsen 
and Concepcion left “considerable uncertainty surrounding the precise 
metes and bounds of the federal common law of arbitrability.”80  As a 
result, Italian Colors provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
resolve lingering uncertainties. 
 
E. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant: A Chance 
for Clarity 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the 
respondents were merchants who accepted American Express charge 
cards and credit cards.81  The agreement at issue was between the 
respondents, American Express, and a wholly owned subsidiary of 
American Express.82  The contract contained an arbitration provision, 
which foreclosed any availability of class proceedings.83  The contract 
also contained a pre-dispute, binding arbitration clause.84  This arbitration 
clause contained several restrictions that effectively foreclosed class 
proceedings, and consequently, any realistic possibility for the 
respondent to seek remedies for any alleged statutory violations.85  The 
 
if they obtain an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.”).  For preferring 
the agreement, see id. (“Moreover, the claim here was most unlikely to go unresolved . . . .  
The district court found this scheme sufficient to provide incentive for the individual 
prosecution of meritorious claims that are not immediately settled, and the Ninth Circuit 
admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be ‘essentially guarantee[d]’ to be 
made whole.  Indeed, the district court concluded that the Concepcions were better off under 
their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have been as participants in a class 
action . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
78 See generally Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to 
Consumer Class Actions?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2013, 8:49 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-
class-actions/. 
79 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51 (severing the claim of unconscionability from 
invocation of the effective vindication rule and explaining that the effective vindication rule 
is a matter of federal law). 
80 D’Antuono v. Serv. Road Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 331 (D. Conn. 2011). 
81 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (discussing the binding arbitration provision containing a clause that “[t]here shall 
be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.”). 
84 Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“That term imposes a variety of procedural bars that would 
WARD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2015  12:56 PM 
162 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1 
binding arbitration and lack of cost-shifting provisions ensured that a 
party could not lessen the burden of pursuing a Sherman Antitrust Act 
claim because these costs greatly exceeded any possible recovery.86 
This created the possibility that an entity engaging in monopolistic 
behavior could encourage and strengthen such behavior by implementing 
a one-sided arbitration provision in its contracts with merchants and 
effectively insulating itself from the risk of any challenges.87  Congress 
did not intend the FAA to permit corporations to disregard federal 
antitrust laws.88 
The respondents brought a class action alleging that American 
Express engaged in monopolistic practices by implementing a form 
contract that contained a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.89  Specifically, the respondents alleged that, through its 
monopoly power, American Express violated the Sherman Antitrust Act 
by compelling various merchants to accept American Express credit 
cards at intercharge rates approximately thirty-percent greater than the 
rates for competing credit cards.90 
 
make pursuit of the antitrust claim a fool's errand.”). 
86 At the district court level, an economist provided a report that estimated the cost of the 
requisite expert analysis to support the antitrust claims would be at least several hundred 
thousand dollars and possibly over one million dollars but the maximum potential recovery 
for an individual party would be $12,850 to $38,549 when trebled.  Am. Express Co., 133 S. 
Ct. at 2308.  For cost-shifting provisions, see Horton, supra note 41 (“One common problem 
is cost-splitting provisions, which usually require plaintiffs to pay half of the arbitral 
expenses.”). 
87 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (explaining that Discover Bank recognized the “perfectly rational view” that 
“the terms of consumer contracts can be manipulated to insulate an agreement’s author from 
liability for its own frauds by ‘deliberately cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money’”) (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 
1100 (Cal. 2005)).  The logical result was illustrated by the Seventh Circuit explaining that 
aggregate proceedings must be exceedingly “unwieldy indeed before it can be pronounced an 
inferior alternative—no matter how massive the fraud or other wrongdoing that will go 
unpunished if class treatment is denied—to no litigation at all” because “[t]he realistic 
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only 
a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30”).  Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th 
Cir. 2004). 
88 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953) (explaining that the reports of both Houses 
stressed that the purpose of the FAA is to “avoid[ ] the delay and expense of litigation”). 
89 The contract contained a binding arbitration provision for all disputes and provided that 
“[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.”  
Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2308. 
90 Id. at 2308.  The practical significance of this rate is that “[a] charge card requires its 
holder to pay the full outstanding balance at the end of a billing cycle; a credit card requires 
payment of only a portion, with the balance subject to interest.”  Id. at n. 1. 
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American Express responded by moving for enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement compelling individual arbitration.91  The FAA was 
the premise of American Express’ motion to compel individual 
arbitration.92  However, the respondents presented evidence of an 
economist’s estimate that the necessary costs associated with proving the 
antitrust claims could exceed $1,000,000, while the maximum recovery 
would be $12,850, or $38,549 if trebled.93 
The District Court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the 
claims.94  On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the waiver was 
unenforceable, opining that the merchants successfully demonstrated that 
the class action waiver resulted in individual arbitration that would yield 
prohibitive costs.95  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari, vacated 
the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings after Stolt–Nielsen 
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.96  On remand, the Court of Appeals 
maintained its reversal.97  The Court of Appeals then, sua sponte, 
reconsidered the decision after Concepcion and reversed again after 
deeming Concepcion inapplicable because preemption was a separate 
issue.98  The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc.99  Once again, 
the Supreme Court then granted certiorari.100 
In its opinion, the majority stressed that arbitration is a matter of 
contract.101  Pursuant to this principle, the majority explained that the 
 
91 Id. at 2308. 
92 Id. 
93 Specifically, the economist estimated that the cost of the necessary expert report(s) 
would be “at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,” while the 
maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.  
Id.  Treble damages are a form of multiplied-damages remedy that can facilitate antitrust 
litigation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
94 In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 2006 WL 662341, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006). 
95 In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2009). 
96 Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010) (citing Stolt–Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l. Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (holding it improper to compel a party to 
submit to class arbitration when there was no agreement to do so). 
97 In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 2011). 
98 Id. at 213.  It is important to note this distinction between the determinative issue of 
preemption in Concepcion and the issue of effective vindication presented in Italian Colors, 
where the tension was between federal statutory rights and the FAA. 
99 In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012). 
100 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
101 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (“[The FAA’s] 
text reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”) (citing Rent–
A–Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010). 
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terms of arbitration agreements ought to be “rigorously enforce[d].”102  
The majority further explained that antitrust laws do not “evinc[e] an 
intention to preclude a waiver” of class procedures.103  The Court stated 
that arbitration agreements must be strictly enforced, even in claims 
regarding an alleged violation of federal statute, “unless the FAA’s 
mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.”104 
The Court opined that “antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable 
procedural path to the vindication of every claim” and cited treble 
damages as an example of Congress’s willingness to facilitate the 
litigation of antitrust claims.105  Furthermore, the Court explained that 
FRCP 23 does not guarantee a party the right to class proceedings in order 
to pursue statutory rights.106  Consequently, the Court relied on this 
reasoning to conclude that there was no “contrary congressional 
command” to override the FAA’s mandate and invalidate the provision.107 
Next, the Court turned to the effective vindication rule.108  The 
majority took a narrow approach to the meaning of effective vindication 
and equated it to the right or ability to merely gain access to a forum for 
litigation, as opposed to the expenses of actually proving the necessary 
elements of the claim.109  Specifically, the majority deemed “the fact that 
it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does 
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”110  
Additionally, the majority contended that the class action waiver was 
analogous to the limitations on parties before the advent of class actions 
 
102 Id. at 2309 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
103 Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
628 (1985)). 
104 Id. (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668–69 (2012)). 
105 Id.  However, by considering the sheer figures at stake, trebled damages are drastically 
inadequate in this case. 
106 Id. at 2309–10.  The Court specifically explained that FRCP has rigorous requirements 
which exclude most claims and that such a guarantee overriding private arbitration 
agreements would be an “abridg[ment] or modif[ication] of a substantive right.”  Id. (quoting 
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012)). 
107 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2309. 
108 Id. at 2310 (“Respondents invoke a judge-made exception to the FAA which, they say, 
serves to harmonize competing federal policies by allowing courts to invalidate agreements 
that prevent the ‘effective vindication’ of a federal statutory right.”). 
109 Id. at 2310–11 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) 
(explaining that such a waiver would “cover a provision . . . forbidding the assertion of certain 
statutory rights.  And it would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to 
arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”).  
110 Id. at 2311. 
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in federal proceedings in 1938.111 
Lastly, the majority opined that Concepcion “all but resolve[d] th[e] 
case.”112  The majority explained that, in Concepcion, the Court 
“specifically rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary to 
prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the legal system.’”113  
In a footnote, the majority explained that Concepcion was concerned with 
the effective vindication rule.114 
 
III. THE EFFECTIVE VINDICATION RULE NEEDS TO BE REVISITED, 
CLARIFIED, AND CODIFIED 
A. The Majority’s Approach to the Entirety of the Contract in the 
Context of the Effective Vindication Rule 
A binding arbitration agreement prohibiting aggregate party 
proceedings may be valid.  That is, the effective vindication rule may not 
operate to invalidate a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  Precedent has 
never explicitly limited the rule’s applicability to the scope of class 
actions alone.  Rather, the effective vindication rule should be applied 
with regard to “prohibitive costs” of all forms. 
The contract at issue in Italian Colors not only prohibited class 
actions, but also provided no other means by which any prohibitive costs 
could be shifted or allocated, such that a party might have a chance of 
pursuing its claims.115  Specifically, the contract contained a 
confidentiality provision that prevented Italian Colors from any out-of-
court arrangement with other similarly situated merchants to collectively 
produce a common expert report.116  There is no rational reason behind 
 
111 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23) (“[T]he individual suit that was considered adequate to 
assure ‘effective vindication’ of a federal right before adoption of class-action procedures did 
not suddenly become ‘ineffective vindication’ upon their adoption.”). 
112  Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)).  
113 Id. (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751). 
114 The Court explained that Concepcion established that states cannot enforce rules 
inconsistent with the FAA, even for unrelated purposes.  Id. at 2319 n. 5 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752–53). 
115 Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“As the Court makes clear, the contract expressly 
prohibits class arbitration.  But that is only part of the problem.”).  The provisions of the 
contract effectively ensured that no one rational party would bring suit alone.  That is, because 
of the lack of cost-sharing options, a party would face the Hobson’s choice of either: (1) 
forgoing their statutory rights; or (2) incurring expenses far greater than any possible recovery 
could yield.  Specifically, the contract prohibited any joinder of claims or parties.  Id. 
116 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The contract’s] confidentiality provision prevents Italian 
Colors from informally arranging with other merchants to produce a common expert report.”). 
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this provision, other than that it was designed primarily to keep costs high 
so individual parties would face prohibitively expensive litigation.117  
Furthermore, the contract did not contain any provisions that might 
mitigate the need for such an economic analysis or expert report.118 
Ancillary, cost-shifting, or cost-splitting provisions are not an 
anomaly.119  Federal courts have already faced issues concerning cost-
splitting provisions.  Notably, some of these circuits held that the lack of 
these provisions render an agreement invalid if they operate to make 
arbitration prohibitively expensive for an individual party.120  Other 
circuits approached these provisions by evaluating their effect on a larger 
scale to other similar parties.121  Remedial cost-shifting provisions are also 
not new to arbitration clauses.  Courts are not homogenous in their 
approach to provisions that preclude a fee-shifting mechanism for fees 
and expenses.122  The same is true for provisions that require an 
unsuccessful party to reimburse the expenses of the opposing party, 
though challenges to such provisions have proven less successful.123 
After Randolph, courts struggled to adopt a uniform and predictable 
approach to cost-shifting provisions.  One approach was adopted by the 
Fourth Circuit in Bradford.124  The Fourth Circuit interpreted Randolph as 
 
117 Id. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“With the [effective vindication rule], companies 
have good reason to adopt arbitral procedures that facilitate efficient and accurate handling of 
complaints.  Without it, companies have every incentive to draft their agreements to extract 
backdoor waivers of statutory rights, making arbitration unavailable or pointless.”). 
118 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
119 See Horton, supra note 41 (briefly discussing the differing approaches various circuits 
have taken when evaluating these cost provisions). 
120 See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 555–57 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
121 See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003). 
122 Compare Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2003) (striking down 
pay-your-way provision as contrary to fee-shifting options under Title VII and the ADEA), 
with Metro East Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Comm. Int’l., Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 
928 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing arbitration provision to preclude fee-shifting system under a 
federal telecommunications statute). 
123 See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that because it was not necessarily proven that the party would ultimately be 
unsuccessful on the merits, this loss was deemed too speculative).  However, note that the 
prospect of incurring such expenses without reimbursement may have a “chilling effect” on 
potential challenges.  See EEOC v. Rappaport, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., 448 F. 
Supp. 2d 458, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669) (analyzing whether 
“the cost of arbitration may have a ‘chilling effect’ on similarly situated litigants, as opposed 
to the particular effect on the plaintiff in the case”). 
124 Bradford, 238 F.3d 549. 
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requiring “some showing of individualized prohibitive expense . . . to 
invalidate an arbitration agreement.”125  Pursuant to this interpretation, the 
court implemented a fact-sensitive, analytical approach to assess the 
challenging party’s financial capacity.126  This assessment was then used 
to determine whether binding arbitration would effectively prevent the 
party from bringing a claim.127  Other circuits have adopted this approach 
but some have interpreted this threshold of hardship to be exceedingly 
high.128 
In contrast to the individualized approach in Bradford, some courts 
have applied a more generalized framework.  The Sixth Circuit rejected 
the Bradford approach as only sufficient for an individual party.129  This 
approach advocates looking beyond an individual party and evaluating 
“whether other similarly situated individuals would be deterred . . . as 
well.”130  The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion illustrates this more general 
framework.  Despite the fact that the challenging party was employed, 
the court invalidated a cost-splitting provision providing that the 
challenging party would pay over $1,000 before proceedings.131  Other 
courts have greeted this framework with mixed opinions.132 
However, the majority in American Express ignored these issues and 
limited the scope of its analysis to include only the distinction between 
aggregate and bilateral proceedings.  Importantly, the scope of the 
analysis should include the totality of the contract and relevant 
circumstances to determine whether there are prohibitively expensive 
 
125 Id. at 557. 
126 Id.  Examples of this could include income, net worth, debt, etc.  Id. 
127 Id. at 558.  This approach looks to the surplus costs that arbitration would yield for 
that party greater than prospective costs of litigation instead.  Id. 
128 See Koridze v. Fannie Mae Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (E.D. Va. 2009) 
(concluding that even though challenging party had minimal financial resources and was 
unemployed, plaintiff’s educational and employment background suggested that she is only 
presently unable to pursue claim and could in future). 
129 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 661 (6th Cir. 2003). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 676–78. 
132 The Second Circuit provides a microcosm for this issue.  See, e.g., EEOC v. 
Rappaport, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., 448 F. Supp. 2d 458, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(citing Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669) (analyzing whether “the cost of arbitration may have a 
‘chilling effect’ on similarly situated litigants, as opposed to the particular effect on the 
plaintiff in the case”); Ball v. SFX Broad., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239–40 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(analyzing not whether a party can afford the arbitral costs, but whether the party will likely 
bear the burden of such costs).  But see In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 
F. Supp. 2d 385, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the Bradford approach). 
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costs that necessitate implication of the effective vindication rule—and 
not simply minimize the analysis to the narrow issue of class arbitration 
versus bilateral arbitration.133  Furthermore, the contract does not contain 
any cost-shifting provisions that would provide for costs to be shifted, 
even partially, to American Express in the event that Italian Colors’ claim 
was successful.134 
This all effectively ensures that, a party would not only need to 
undertake such an expensive study, but that a party would also be stuck 
with the bill for such a necessary study regardless of the outcome.  That 
is, even if Italian Colors’ claim was successful and the Court held that 
American Express had indeed violated the Sherman Act, Italian Colors 
would still be left holding the bill with drastically little monetary recovery 
from the ruling.135  Indeed, even after a judgment for Italian Colors, the 
company would likely have lost money because the litigation expenses 
would outweigh the damages awarded.136 
The majority in American Express did not thoroughly address the 
notion that the contract not only prohibited class arbitration, but also 
eliminated any possibility of “sharing, shifting, or shrinking necessary 
costs.”137  Instead, the majority acknowledged the issue of cost-sharing 
provisions in a footnote, explaining that the “[p]etitioners denied that, and 
that is not what the Court of Appeals decision under review here held.  It 
held that, because other forms of cost-sharing were not economically 
feasible (‘the only economically feasible means for . . . enforcing 
[respondents’] statutory rights is via a class action’), the class-action 
waiver was unenforceable.”138  Dissenting, Justice Elena Kagan disputed 
that the class action waiver itself was all that needed to be considered.139  
 
133 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2318–19 (2013) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (explaining how a pre-dispute arbitration clause prohibiting class arbitration 
may still be valid if there are other avenues to overcome costs). 
134 Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
135 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Amex has put Italian Colors to this choice: Spend way, 
way, way more money than your claim is worth, or relinquish your Sherman Act rights.”). 
136 The estimated cost of the necessary expert report(s) would be “at least several hundred 
thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,” while the maximum recovery for an 
individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.  Id. at 2308.  
137 Id. at 2308–12. 
138 Id. at 2311 n.4 (quoting In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d 
Cir. 2012)). 
139 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Our decision [in Green 
Tree] made clear that a provision raising a plaintiff’s costs could foreclose consideration of 
federal claims, and so run afoul of the effective-vindication rule.”). 
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Justice Kagan asserted that Randolph considered the entire scope of the 
contract including cost-sharing provisions, therefore the majority’s 
analysis was too narrow.140  Consequently, because the majority did not 
rely on cost-sharing provisions in the decision, the implications of such 
provisions remains unclear. 
The key is cost effectiveness in the aggregate, and it is not simply 
one aspect of the agreement that should invoke the effective vindication 
rule or present an issue.  Rather, it is for a court to decide whether the 
totality of the circumstances which—taken together—result in pursuing 
a claim “prohibitively expensive.”141  The American Express majority 
applied a very narrow focus to the issue, essentially including only the 
prohibition on class proceedings in the contract.142  However, the effective 
vindication rule’s relationship to the FAA to ensure an equitable result 
should apply to the entirety of the contract, no matter how it manages to 
foreclose the possibility of pursuing meritorious federal claims.143  The 
majority honed in on the class action waiver as the sole issue and made 
several legitimate and persuasive points, assuming it was the only aspect 
of this contract.144 
The Court contended that the class action waiver only limits the 
arbitration to two parties and therefore does not take away from a party’s 
right to pursue its federal claims any more than federal law prior to the 
adoption of the class action process.145  However, the landscape of 
litigation has certainly changed since 1938, and class actions are now 
 
140 Id. (“The expense at issue in Randolph came from a filing fee combined with a per-
diem payment for the arbitrator.  But nothing about those particular costs is distinctive; and 
indeed, a rule confined to them would be weirdly idiosyncratic.”). 
141 For a sampling of possible cost-sharing mechanisms, see id. at 2318–19 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
142 See id. at 2319 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority took a narrow 
approach and did not consider how the entire contract operates). 
143 Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The majority] concocts a special exemption for 
class-arbitration waivers—ignoring that this case concerns much more than that.  Throughout, 
the majority disregards our decisions’ central tenet: An arbitration clause may not thwart 
federal law, irrespective of exactly how it does so.”). 
144 Id. at 2318–19 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing how the majority limits their 
analysis to the waiver instead of evaluating the entire effect of the contract). 
145 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (“The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration 
to the two contracting parties.  It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their 
statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 
1938.  Or, to put it differently, the individual suit that was considered adequate to assure 
‘effective vindication’ of a federal right before adoption of class-action procedures did not 
suddenly become ‘ineffective vindication’ upon their adoption.”). 
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more commonplace.  Therefore, the meaning of “effective vindication” 
should not apply so narrowly, such that it only addresses what was 
considered “effective” at the time of the FAA’s enactment.  The benefit 
of certainty derived from a rigid rule allowing such an approach may not 
outweigh the harm done to those parties without any prudent means 
necessary to pursue their claims.  A court’s analysis should consider the 
totality of the circumstances and should not be limited to what may have 
been “effective” decades ago.146  The majority gave this issue little 
consideration through a footnote.147 
 
B. The Majority’s Approach to Ancillary Provisions in the 
Contract 
The majority largely ignored ancillary provisions that prevented any 
form of cost-shifting whatsoever.148  Consequently, the validity of these 
ancillary provisions remains unclear for future cases.  The majority 
quickly brushed away this discussion in a footnote reasoning that the 
opinion from the decision on appeal before the Court had held that, 
because the other forms of cost-sharing were not economically feasible, 
“the only economically feasible means for . . . enforcing [respondents’] 
statutory rights is via a class action . . . .”149  However, the Court would 
have been wise to simply address the ancillary provisions in dicta, at the 
least, to provide future guidance instead of summarily ignoring them. 
As explained by Justice Kagan, the majority in Italian Colors failed 
to address any of the ancillary provisions of the agreement, which 
effectively prohibited the respondents from pursuing a claim.150  Because 
the majority did not address these ancillary provisions, there is no process 
or standard in place by which lower courts can evaluate them.  Rather, 
lower courts are left with a rigid and narrow application of the FAA and 
 
146 Id. at 2319 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he effective-vindication rule asks about the 
world today, not the world as it might have looked when Congress passed a given statute.”). 
147 See id. at 2311 n. 4 (“Who can disagree with the dissent’s assertion that ‘the effective-
vindication rule asks about the world today, not the world as it might have looked when 
Congress passed a given statute’? But time does not change the meaning of effectiveness, 
making ineffective vindication today what was effective vindication in the past.”) (citation 
omitted). 
148 Id. at 2319 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that “[i]t is only in this Court that the 
case has become strangely narrow, as the majority stares at a single provision rather than 
considering, in the way the effective-vindication rule demands, how the entire contract 
operates”). 
149 Id. at 2311 n. 4. 
150 See id. at 2316–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
WARD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2015  12:56 PM 
2015] DIVIDE & CONQUER 171 
the effective vindication rule. 
Faced with another case, the Supreme Court can properly address 
the ancillary provisions.  The Italian Colors opinion took a large bite out 
of the effective vindication rule as it allows a loophole for these entities 
to implement clever ancillary provisions, which work in concert to 
foreclose any possibility of a claim being brought because of exorbitant 
costs or unusual proceedings, such as a very brief statute of limitations to 
bring the claim.151  Therefore, the Supreme Court should address this 
issue. 
 
C. The Majority’s Application of Concepcion 
The majority also claims that Concepcion “all but resolves the 
case.”152  However, there are several issues with this conclusion.  First, 
the effective vindication rule applies to the FAA in relation to other 
federal statutory rights, whereas Concepcion concerned preemption 
between the FAA and a conflicting state law.153  Second, the pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement in Concepcion allowed for more cost-shifting than 
did the contract at issue in Italian Colors and therefore differs in kind.154  
Third, Concepcion concluded that the FAA preempted a state rule 
requiring the availability of class procedures before arbitration would be 
enforced.155  However, the issue is not as narrow as simply the availability 
 
151 See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If the rule were 
limited to baldly exculpatory provisions, however, a monopolist could devise numerous ways 
around it . . . .  On the front end: The agreement might set outlandish filing fees or establish 
an absurd (e.g., one-day) statute of limitations, thus preventing a claimant from gaining access 
to the arbitral forum.  On the back end: The agreement might remove the arbitrator's authority 
to grant meaningful relief, so that a judgment gets the claimant nothing worthwhile.  And in 
the middle: The agreement might block the claimant from presenting the kind of proof that is 
necessary to establish the defendant's liability—say, by prohibiting any economic testimony 
. . . .  Or else the agreement might appoint as an arbitrator an obviously biased person . . . .  
The possibilities are endless—all less direct than an express exculpatory clause, but no less 
fatal.  So the rule against prospective waivers of federal rights can work only if it applies not 
just to a contract clause explicitly barring a claim, but to others that operate to do so.”). 
152 Id. at 2312 (“Truth to tell, our decision in [Concepcion] all but resolves this case.”). 
153 The majority concluded that the “[b]ecause it ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ California's 
Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.”  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
154 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. at 1753) (explaining that the claim in Concepcion was “‘most unlikely to go unresolved’ 
because AT&T’s agreement contained a host of features ensuring that ‘aggrieved customers 
who filed claims would be essentially guaranteed to be made whole.’”).  
155 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1755 (abrogating Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 
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of class procedure, but rather, is whether the party has any means of 
effectively vindicating a meritorious federal claim under the totality of 
the contract.156 
Concepcion boiled down to a simple issue of federal law preempting 
conflicting state law.157  Nowhere in the opinion did the Court cite any 
precedent concerning the effective vindication rule; yet the majority in 
Italian Colors swiftly disposed of the issue by claiming that Concepcion 
“all but resolves” the case.158  However, the preemption doctrine is an 
entirely distinct concern removed from the realm of the effective 
vindication rule.  The Second Circuit properly recognized this important 
distinction on remand when the Court deemed Concepcion inapplicable 
because it addressed a matter of preemption.159  Where preemption 
concerns federal law trumping conflicting state law, the effective 
vindication rule applies to the friction created when the FAA threatens to 
lessen the enforcement of federal statutory rights.160 
 
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)). 
156 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The effective-vindication 
rule asks whether an arbitration agreement as a whole precludes a claimant from enforcing 
federal statutory rights.  No single provision is properly viewed in isolation, because an 
agreement can close off one avenue to pursue a claim while leaving others open.  In this case, 
for example, the agreement could have prohibited class arbitration without offending the 
effective-vindication rule if it had provided an alternative mechanism to share, shift, or reduce 
the necessary costs.  The agreement's problem is that it bars not just class actions, but also all 
mechanisms—many existing long before the Sherman Act, if that matters—for joinder or 
consolidation of claims, informal coordination among individual claimants, or amelioration 
of arbitral expenses.”) (emphasis in original). 
157 Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“When a state rule allegedly conflicts with the 
FAA, we apply standard preemption principles, asking whether the state law frustrates the 
FAA’s purposes and objectives.  If the state rule does so—as the Court found in 
[Concepcion]—the Supremacy Clause requires its invalidation.  We have no earthly interest 
(quite the contrary) in vindicating that law.  Our effective-vindication rule comes into play 
only when the FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law, like the Sherman Act 
here.”).  The preemption doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause, which establishes federal 
law the “Supreme Law of the Land.”  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Gade v. Nat’l Solid 
Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (explaining that the “preemption doctrine is 
derived” from the Supremacy Clause). 
158 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2319–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[Concepcion] was 
not—and could not have been—about the effective-vindication rule.  Here is a tip-off: 
[Concepcion] nowhere cited our effective-vindication precedents.”). 
159 Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal 
Arbitration Act—Supreme Court Cases, 28 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (originally published in 2008) 
(“The Second Circuit panel found [Concepcion] inapplicable because it addressed 
preemption.”). 
160 Preemption issues are applied categorically to three situations.  Express preemption 
occurs where the text of the statute facially expresses the intent to preempt state law.  English 
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The premise that the FAA preempts conflicting state law was 
established well before Concepcion in Southland Corp. v. Keating.161  
Relying on the legislative history behind the FAA, the Supreme Court 
majority held that “[i]n creating a substantive rule applicable in state as 
well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative 
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”162  
Furthermore, as in Concepcion, the effective vindication rule was 
inapplicable.  There, the tension between the majority and dissent was 
regarding basic federalism concerns.163  Dissenting, Justice John Paul 
Stevens relied on the Savings Clause of Section 2 of the FAA, which 
provides that arbitration contracts are revocable upon “such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”164  Justice 
Stevens argued that there is a presumption against preemption in areas 
traditionally dominated by the states (in this case, contract law).165  
However, the majority rejected this argument and concluded that the 
FAA preempted California’s anti-waiver rule in the realm of arbitration 
contracts.166  Notably, Justice Scalia resurrected this issue in Italian 
Colors even though the dispute did not concern preemption in the 
slightest.167 
 
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).  Implied field preemption occurs where there 
is either pervasive federal regulation or a dominant federal interest in a field such that state 
law is preempted.  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  Implied conflict 
preemption occurs where state law makes it impossible for someone to comply with both 
federal law and state law or where state law effectively serves as an obstacle to the purpose 
of the federal legislation.  See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 
142–43 (1963) (discussing impossibility preemption); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941) (discussing obstacle preemption). 
161 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
162 Id. at 16. 
163 Compare AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) 
(explaining that “California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA”), with 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But federalism is as much a question 
of deeds as words.  It often takes the form of a concrete decision by this Court that respects 
the legitimacy of a State's action in an individual case.  Here, recognition of that federalist 
ideal, embodied in specific language in this particular statute, should lead us to uphold 
California's law, not to strike it down.  We do not honor federalist principles in their breach.”). 
164 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)). 
165 Id. at 18–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. at 16 n.10 (“[H]olding that the Arbitration Act preempts a state law that withdraws 
the power to enforce arbitration agreements . . . .”). 
167 “Justice Scalia said the FAA reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a 
matter of contract, and he cited the Court’s decision in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 
132 S. Ct. 665, 181 L. Ed. 2d 586 (2012), as recognizing that this principle holds true for 
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It is important to note that the state law at issue in Concepcion 
prohibited class-action waivers even if a party could effectively vindicate 
its claim in individual arbitration.168 Therefore, the waiver at issue in 
Concepcion had no occasion to be addressed via the effective vindication 
rule as it concerned the preemption of a state law.169  The Court clarified 
that the waiver’s ancillary provisions made it practically certain that a 
party would be able to vindicate its rights.170  Thus, the majority 
incorrectly applied precedent that is not concerned with the effective 
vindication rule and should have properly applied the effective 
vindication precedent to address the tension between the FAA and federal 
statutory claims where the party may not be otherwise able to effectively 
vindicate its rights.171 
The class action waiver at issue in Concepcion differed greatly from 
that in Italian Colors because of the ancillary provisions contained in 
each case.  In Italian Colors, the ancillary provisions at issue completely 
foreclosed any possibility of cost-shifting, cost-sharing, or cost-
recovery.172  However, the waiver at issue in Concepcion provided for 
significant cost-sharing—so much so, that the Court even explained the 
complaint was “most unlikely to go unresolved” because of the 
provisions providing that “aggrieved customers who filed claims would 
be essentially guaranteed to be made whole.”173  Therefore, the Court 
 
claims that allege a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA’s mandate has been 
overridden by a contrary congressional command.”  Rosenhouse, supra note 159. 
168 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745) (“[T]he state law in question made class-
action waivers unenforceable even when a party could feasibly vindicate her claim in an 
individual arbitration.  The state rule was designed to preserve the broad-scale ‘deterrent 
effects of class actions,’ not merely to protect a particular plaintiff's right to assert her own 
claim.”). 
169 Id. at 2319–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[Concepcion] was not—and could not have 
been—about the effective-vindication rule.  Here is a tip-off: [Concepcion] nowhere cited our 
effective-vindication precedents . . . . [Concepcion] involved a state law, and therefore could 
not possibly implicate the effective-vindication rule.  When a state rule allegedly conflicts 
with the FAA, we apply standard preemption principles, asking whether the state law 
frustrates the FAA’s purposes and objectives.”). 
170 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
171 Am. Express Co.,, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
Concepcion does not apply and “[t]he relevant decisions are instead Mitsubishi and 
Randolph”). 
172 Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the waiver also not only prohibits 
class arbitration, but also eliminates any possibility of “sharing, shifting, or shrinking 
necessary costs”). 
173 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (“Moreover, the claim here was most unlikely to go 
WARD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2015  12:56 PM 
2015] DIVIDE & CONQUER 175 
expressly provided that the waiver posed no risk to the effective 
vindication of an aggrieved party’s statutory rights and therefore could in 
no way apply to the issue in Italian Colors, or “a party’s ability to 
vindicate a meritorious claim.”174  Surprisingly, Justice Scalia authored 
both opinions, and although emphasizing the cost-shifting provisions in 
Concepcion, Justice Scalia entirely ignored them in Italian Colors despite 
claiming that Concepcion resolved the issues.175 
The Italian Colors majority relied on the holding in Concepcion by 
stating that the Court “specifically rejected the argument that class 
arbitration was necessary” to resolve the issue.176  Nowhere does Italian 
Colors argue solely that the prohibition on class proceedings alone 
deprives them of the ability to effectively vindicate their claim.  However, 
the majority framed the issue in such a narrow manner that made this the 
only plausible way to apply Concepcion to this case at all.177 
 
D. The Majority’s Interpretation of the Ability to Effectively 
Vindicate Federal Statutory Rights 
The Italian Colors majority attempted to distinguish the costs at 
issue from those in Randolph.178  In Randolph, the expenses were to be 
incurred at the onset of the claim.179  In contrast, the issue in Italian Colors 
was that the plaintiffs’ total cost of pursuing their claims would outweigh 
the potential recovery.180  There is no practical difference between the 
 
unresolved . . . .  The Ninth Circuit admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims would 
be ‘essentially guarantee[d]’ to be made whole.  Indeed, the district court concluded that the 
Concepcions were better off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would 
have been as participants in a class action . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
174 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So the Court professed 
that [Concepcion] did not implicate the only thing . . . this case involves.”). 
175 Compare Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (explaining that the cost-shifting provisions 
practically ensured an aggrieved party’s ability to vindicate their rights), with Am. Express 
Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2308–12 (discussing the merits of the argument to the exclusion of the lack 
of cost-shifting provisions in the arbitration agreement). 
176 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2312. 
177 Id. (“The idea that [Concepcion] controls here depends entirely on the majority’s view 
that this case is ‘class action or bust.’  Were the majority to drop that pretense, it could make 
no claim for [Concepcion]’s relevance.”). 
178 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
179 See Green Tree Fin. Corp, 531 U.S. at 84 (explaining that the claimant faced 
potentially steep filing fees and arbitrators’ costs). 
180 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The expense at issue in 
Green Tree Financial Corp came from a filing fee combined with a per-diem payment for the 
arbitrator.”).  The prospective expenses in Italian Colors largely consisted of the cost to 
produce an expert report.  Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat expert report would cost 
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costs in Randolph and the costs in Italian Colors because the costs must 
necessarily exceed the maximum potential recovery, and there was no 
adequate cost-recovery or cost-shifting possible.  In fact, the costs 
incurred by Italian Colors would likely outweigh the maximum potential 
recovery by ten to one in a best-case scenario.181  To make such fine 
distinctions between the filing fees in Randolph and necessary expert 
reports in Italian Colors is irrational because there is no practical 
difference in their effect on deterring claims.182  Therefore, there is no 
reason to treat them differently, as they both present the same issue and 
make pursuing a claim prohibitively expensive.183  That is, both forms of 
expenses must necessarily be incurred in order to bring the challenge in 
the first place.184 
Furthermore, the Italian Colors majority asserted that Mitsubishi did 
not apply because Italian Colors was not explicitly prohibited from 
asserting the right and that Randolph did not apply because Italian Colors 
was not forced to incur filing and administrative fees, that effectively 
made “access to the forum impracticable.”185  The majority distinguished 
the Italian Colors issue as being one of “proving a statutory remedy.”186  
However, no precedent expressly limits the scope of the effective 
vindication rule solely to “baldly exculpatory clauses” and “prohibitive 
fees” as the majority contends.187  By imposing this restriction on the 
rule’s scope, the majority allowed entities to impose other more creative 
provisions that would effectively both insulate the entity from liability 
and place the provision outside of the baldly exculpatory clauses or 
 
between several hundred thousand and one million dollars.”). 
181 Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So the expense involved in proving the claim in 
arbitration is ten times what Italian Colors could hope to gain, even in a best-case scenario.  
That counts as a “prohibitive” cost, in Green Tree Financial Corp.’s terminology, if anything 
does.  No rational actor would bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so 
meant incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands.”). 
182 Id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The expense at issue in Randolph came from a 
filing fee combined with a per-diem payment for the arbitrator.  But nothing about those 
particular costs is distinctive; and indeed, a rule confined to them would be weirdly 
idiosyncratic.”). 
183 Id. 
184 Put simply: without paying the filing fees, there would be no access to the arbitral 
forum in Randolph and without paying for the expert reports, there would be no basis for the 
claim at all in Italian Colors.  In either case, the costs operate as a prerequisite to the challenge. 
185 See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11. 
186 Id. at 2311. 
187 Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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prohibitive fees the majority limited the scope to.188 
 
E. Revisiting, Clarifying, and Codifying the Effective Vindication 
Rule to Provide Guidance, Reel in Business Entities, and Bring 
Predictability to Courts’ Opinions 
In Italian Colors, the majority framed the issue as “whether a 
contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal 
Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a 
federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.”189  This approach 
is far too narrow.  The effective vindication rule should be interpreted 
more flexibly to account for the totality of the contract and relevant 
surrounding circumstances at issue, as large-scale, pre-dispute arbitration 
contracts become more prevalent, creative, and controversial.  Such a 
narrow and rigid approach is far too inadequate for the purposes of 
addressing future developments. 
The standard for invoking the effective vindication rule should be 
clarified to apply whenever the FAA threatens to foreclose other federal 
statutory rights.  In making this determination, courts should consider any 
and all provisions that function, individually or in combination, to prevent 
a party from effectively vindicating a party’s statutory rights.  To prevent 
should include, but not be limited to: baldly exculpatory clauses, 
prohibitive fees, and a lack of cost-shifting or cost-recovery provisions, 
which function to make pursuit of the claim reasonably certain to be 
either financially imprudent or expressly barred. 
It is evident from the disparity between the majority and dissent in 
Italian Colors as well as the opinions throughout the procedural history 
of Italian Colors, that case law interpreting the effective vindication rule 
does not provide clear guidance.190  Chapter One of the FAA contains 
sixteen sections.191  Section 2 addresses the “[v]alidity, irrevocability, and 
 
188 See id. at 2317–18. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (providing examples of provisions which 
fall outside the scope of the decision but may still insulate the party from liability).  See also 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d at 1110 (Cal. 2005) (“[I]n a consumer contract of 
adhesion [when] . . . disputes . . . involve small amounts of damages . . . the waiver [of a class 
action] becomes in practice the exemption of the party from responsibility for [its] own 
fraud.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
189 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2307. 
190 Compare, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010), with In re 
Am. Exp. Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom., Am. Exp. Co., 133 S. 
Ct. at 2304. 
191 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
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enforcement of agreements to arbitrate” and therefore the effective 
vindication rule fits this section.192  However, there is a danger that this 
section already provides for common law state contract defenses that 
have previously been mistakenly entangled with the effective vindication 
rule.193  Thus, the text of the amendment must make clear that the effective 
vindication rule is a separate theory.  Specifically, the text must make 
clear that this Section applies only when the FAA threatens to foreclose 
other federal statutory rights.  This distinction can ensure that federalism 
issues are avoided.194 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The effective vindication rule was developed as a tool for preserving 
federal statutory rights in the face of the FAA, but the rule has not been 
applied consistently.195  As Italian Colors shows, there is considerable 
disagreement concerning the role of the effective vindication rule and 
how it should be applied to balance the relationship between the FAA and 
threatened federal statutory rights.196  Consequently, the effective 
vindication rule must be revisited and clarified to provide for a more 
explicit standard or process to include an analysis of the totality of the 
contract.  Furthermore, Chapter One of the FAA should be amended to 
codify the effective vindication rule.  Because Section 2 of the FAA 
concerns “[v]alidity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate,” the effective vindication rule should be provided under this 
section.197  The rule could be codified as follows: 
 
 
 
192 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
193 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“[A contract] shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).  See supra Part 
II.A (discussing unconscionability defense’s early relationship with the effective vindication 
rule).  See also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51 (2011) 
(severing the claim of unconscionability from invocation of the effective vindication rule and 
explaining that the effective vindication rule is a matter of federal law). 
194 Specifically, this is to eliminate any tension between state law issues and the FAA.  
For further discussion on federalism, see Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 
YALE J. ON REG. 465 (1996). 
195 For an overview of the development of the effective vindication rule and its 
application, see supra Part II. 
196 Compare supra Part II (explaining the development of the effective vindication rule), 
with supra Part III (discussing both the majority’s and dissent’s application of the effective 
vindication to federal statutory rights). 
197 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or 
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement 
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out 
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable except: 
(A) Upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract; or 
(B) If the contract operates to effectively foreclose the availability of 
a party’s ability to prudently and effectively pursue the 
vindication of federal statutory rights, such a provision may be 
invalidated where necessary to preserve the effect of federal 
statutory rights and invalidate contracts which frustrate public 
policy.  The party challenging the contract must bear the burden 
of presenting evidence that is beyond mere speculation.198 
Only through an express statement of this standard will contracting 
parties be able to conduct business with confidence regarding how courts 
will evaluate any arbitration clauses.  By having a clear standard in place, 
courts will also be able to address these disputes with greater consistency.  
Until then, the effective vindication rule’s role remains unresolved and in 
a state of flux that unnecessarily increases transaction costs to 
commercial entities and poses a substantial risk that future meritorious 
claims will be forgone. 
 
198 The language in Section A is presently codified.  The language concerning the ability 
to effectively pursue statutory remedies is borrowed from Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985) (“[I]n the event . . . clauses operated 
in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust 
violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public 
policy.”) (citing Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); Redel’s Inc. 
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 98–99 (5th Cir. 1974); Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Bd. of 
Trade, Inc., 386 F.2d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 1967); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, 221 F.2d 
173, 180 (8th Cir. 1955); 15 S. WILLISTON Contracts § 1750A (3d ed. 1972)).  Also, note that 
the language refers only to the tension between the FAA and federal statutory rights to 
distinguish the issue of preemption from Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (California’s rule 
from Discover Bank was preempted by FAA).  The addition of the challenging party bearing 
the burden of showing that the threat to the ability to pursue causes of action must be more 
than mere speculation is derived from Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 
90 (2000) (“The ‘risk’ that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative 
to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”). 

WARD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2015 12:56 PM 
 
 
 
